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the person who types your 
letters, organizes your files, 
takes your calls, prepares 
your expense reports. 
That's right. Sit the candidates down and let them do the job. 

Secretarial job Simulation is more than some simple typing test. AccuRater 

provides an actual work sample of the Secretarial jab. 

All the candidates you consider can type. But you want to know more. 

You need to know more. 

Keyboarding • Proofreading • Text Editing • Filing • Basic Math • 

Spelling • Reading Comprehension ... the skills that are tested. The skills 

your secretary must have. 

AccuRater has the experience. Since 1985, we have developed aseries of 

pre-employment job simulations. All computer based. And using the latest 

technology available. Each one developed from first-hand job analysis. 





Oh, you can give a plain ol' typing test if you want to. Or you can . 
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The Commentators Speak: 

Emerging Trends in the Legal Analysis 

of Affirmative Action 

Stan Malos, J.D., Ph.D. 
San Jose State University .. 
In the last issue of TIP, I suggested that the controversy over affirmative 
action would likely continue to heat up. That prediction has proven to be 
something of an understatement. In a ruling that will probably· force the 
Supreme Court to reconsider the affinnative action issue dUring its next 
session, a federal appellate court recently struck down on equal protection 
grounds an admissions policy at the University of Texas law school which 
gave preference to black and Hispanic applicants (Hopwood v. State of 
Texas, U.S. App. LEXIS 4719, 5th Cir., March 1996). Although the 
appellate court's order to eliminate affirmative action-based admissions in 
Texas has been stayed pending further appeal, various proposals to end 
affirmative action are getting serious attention in state legislatures, public 
university governing boards, and grass-roots initiatives in Arizona, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington, respectively. Meanwhile, California has 
continued to serve as a lightning rod for affirmative action issues: the 
California Civil Rights Initiative (which would ban preferential treatment 
based on race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin) made it onto the fall 
ballot in March, a bill passed the Judiciary Committee of the state assembly 
in April which would impose criminal liability on any college or 
government official granting a racial or gender preference, the Clinton 
administration came under fire for awarding a $3.2 million contract through 
the Commerce Department's Minority Business Development Agency to a 
Los Angeles firm known to be running a huge operating deficit and 
carrying nearly $1 million in unpaid tax liens, and a San Francisco Bay 
Area county government stunned local affirmative action specialists and 
EEOC officials by disclosing the existence of-and its failure to meet-hiring 
goals for whites and males as part of its affirmative action plan. 
Although it is important to remain apprised of these and other 
affirmative action developments on executive, judicial, and legislative 
fronts, it may also be helpful, in attempting to make more proactive sense 
of the affirmative action landscape, to examine the comments of legal 
scholars with respect to trends in the analysis of affirmative action. This 
article provides the reader with guidance in that process by digesting recent 
law review commentaries which address important aspects of affirmative 
action. These aspects include affirmative action implications of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Adarand 
33 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, reverse discrimination, the Glass Ceiling Initia­
tive, and the relationship of employment tests to the economic "efficiency" 
of affirmative action plans (AAPs). An overview of other elements of the 
affirmative action debate can lie found in Terpstra, Affirmative Action: A 
Focus on the Issues, 46 Lab. L.J. 307 (1995). 
Affirmative Action Implications of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
An excellent starting point for gaining a broader perspective on the 
legal analysis of affirmative action can be found in Munro, The Continuing 
Evolution ofAffirmative Action under Title VII: New Directions after the 
Civil Rights Act of I991, 81 Va. L.Rev. 565 (1995). This article demon­
strates that, contrary to popular belief, the CRA of 1991 did not provide 
clear support for affirmative action Rather, passage of the Act at best 
served to maintain, but not codify, previous law on affirmative action, 
which remains highly subject to ongoing judicial revision. The article 
points out that a core of current Supreme Court justices disfavors 
affirmative action, which often "unfairly squeezes employers between the 
competing demands of disparate treatment and disparate impact law" (81 
Va. L.Rev. at 574; the latter theory is typically used by protected class non­
members to challenge affirmative action programs). 
Munro's article also explains how the debate surrounding the use of 
quotas in AAPs ultimately left the Act ambiguous and contradictory with 
respect to race-based preferences in employment. A primary focus of the 
debate involved elements of disparate impact liability, including the 
definition of "business necessity" for use in defending employment 
practices which have a disparate impact, and whether quotas would' be 
required in practical terms to avoid such liability. Nevertheless, the 
definitions which ultimately appeared in Section I 04 of the Act failed to 
define either business necessity or job relatedness, and left the courts with 
broad interpretive discretion, notwithstanding Section lOS's stated intent to 
revert to the law as it had existed prior to the Supreme Court's 1989 Wards 
Cove decision. In addition, Section 106's prohibition against "race-nor­
ruing" of employment tests (adjustment of scores along racial lines) made it 
more likely that employers with demographic imbalances in their 
workforces would be forced to adopt outright racial preferences, which are 
increasingly subject to reverse discrimination attack. Even Section 116's 
"simple, direct" language that nothing in the Act "should be construed to 
affect affirmative action [programs] that are in accordance with the law" 
carries the implied caveat that not all such programs are legal. Rather than 
explicitly validating or preserving programs that are "in accordance," this 
language leaves the propriety of individual AAPs up to the courts. In sum, 
Munro argues, these sections of the Act "produce a decidedly muddled 
picture of congressional intent ... [ courts] may discern a curious 'canceling 
out' effect among the relevant sections." The author maintains that failure 
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of the Act to support affirmative action Was a result of conservatives' 
success in framing the debate as one about quotas, and that, "in their rush to 
define the Civil Rights bill as anti-preference legislation ...supporters of 
affirmative action were the chief source of the provisions that 'cancel out' 
the proaffirmative action sections" (81 Va. L.Rev. at 599-601). 
Munro's article concludes with an interesting proposal for replacing 
racial preferences with economic disadvantage preferences, a proposal that 
might bear consideration should the subject of affirmative action be 
legislatively revisited in the future. A principal goal of affirmative action is 
to reapportion jobs and wealth such that the economic position of 
minorities becomes mughly equal to that of whites. Because economic 
st.tus correlates significantly with race, this goal can be more directly (and 
less controversially) accomplished by ail economic, rather than a racial, 
approach. Economic issues in- the context of affirmative action are 
addressed further below. 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: The Supreme Court's Decision in 
Historical Perspective 
As discussed in the previous issue of TIP, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995) held that federal 
affirmative action programs that use racial and ethnic criteria as bases for 
decision making are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. This standard 
requires that an AAP be "narrowly tailored" to effectuate a "compelling 
government interest." Successful defense of an AAP under this standard 
typically requires either specific evidence of past discrimination caused by 
the program which the AAP seeks to redress or a "manifest imbalance" 
between the makeup of an organization's work force and that of the local 
labor pool, and a showing that the rights of non-minorities have not been 
"unnecessarily trammeled" (Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. v. 
Weber, 443 US. 193, (1979)). 
When read in context with previous Supreme Court affirmative action 
cases that have avoided explicit reliance on race-based discourse (see 
Winkler, Sounds ofSilence: The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action, 28 
Loyola L.A. L.Rev. 923, (1995)), the Adarand decision may merely 
represent further evidence that the law on affirmative action will continue 
to be rewritten judicially in the absence of legislatiye attempts to fill the 
statutory void left by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Nevertheless, pending 
further action on Hopwood, Adarand remains the Supreme Court's latest 
pronouncement in the affirmative action area. Insights into the implications 
of the decision can be gleaned from Robinson, Fink, and Allen, Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: New Standards Governing the Permissibility of 
Federal Contract Set-Asides and Affirmative Action, 46 Lab. L.J. 661 









hanced Scrutiny ofAffirmative Action Programs, 5 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 
933 (1995). 
First, it is important to claritY what the Adarand decision does and does 
not do with respect to existing law. As Robinson et al., point out, prior to 
Adarand, there were two different standards with respect to state or local 
racial classifications on one hand, and those in federal affirmative action 
and set-aside programs on the other ( 46 Lab. L.J. at 665). The former were 
held to strict judicial scrutiny before Adarand, as they still are; all such 
classifications were conclusively presumed to be invidious by their very 
existence. The latter (federal) classifications, however, were presumed to 
be "benign," and were thus held only to"intermediate" scrutiny (i.e., only 
had to serve a ''signifi~ant" government purpose, rather than a 
"compelling" one; Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 ( 1990)). 
Adarand brings these two standards into alignment; federally imposed 
preferential treatment is still allowable, but only under more exacting 
standards of judicial review. Robinson et al. predict that most federal 
programs will be able to meet the compelling government interest test, but 
are more likely to run afoul of the "narrowly tailored" language, which 
requires that race-neutral alternatives be considered and found unworkable 
before race-based programs can be permissibly implel)lented ( 46 Lab. L.J. 
at 667). 
Next, it is important to determine what the Adarand decision forecasts 
with respect to future changes in the law applicable to AAPs. In this 
regard, interested readers may fmd Welsh's analysis illuminating. This 
article was written while the Adarand case was pending, but its thorough 
analysis of prior judicial decisions, speeches, and writings of individual 
Supreme Court justices enabled the author to correctly predict the increased 
scrutiny now applicable to federal AAPs. Welsh observes that at least one 
Justice (Stevens) appears likely to focus on the characteristics shared by 
members of a disadvantaged class (e.g., socio-economic, rather than racial 
ones) that justifY the use of AAPs. This analysis may open the door for 
economic-based classifications to supplant more objectionable race-based 
classifications (as Mu~o proposes), in order to prevent complete 
abolishment of AAPs. It is interesting to note here that economic 
classifications need only survive the more lenient "rational basis" standard 
of review, under which classifications need only be shown to be rationally 
related to a "legitimate" (as opposed to "significant" or "compelling") 





Affirmative Action and Reverse Discrim.i.nation 
It has been estimated that almost two thirds of the population (women 
and minorities) are entitled to preferential treatment under affirmative 
action, while the other third (white males) are not (see Terpstra, 46 Lab. L.J 
at 308; Kandel, 21 Empl. Rel. L.J. at 114). It is thus not surprising that 
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reverse discrimination cases have received increasing attention over the last 
several years, and reflect pressure to modifY the force of existing AAPs. 
The number of race-based discrimination charges filed with the EEOC by 
white males increased from just over 1,200 in 1990 to about 1,400 in 1993­
1994 (an average of about 4.4% of all race-based complaints), and the 
number of gender-based discrimination charges filed by white males 
increased from just over 3,000 to almost 4,400 over the.same period (an 
average of almost 18% of all gender-based EEOC complaints). As noted in 
Kauffinan, Miller, and Ivey, 4.ffirmative Action and the White Male in 
America, 46 Lab. L.J. 692 (1995), a number of recent court cases (many of 
which coincidentally "involve law enforcement agencies) have found that 
affirmative action plans impeimissibly infringe upon the rights of protected 
class non-members with respect to organizational practices including selec­
tion, promotion, and reductions in force. These include San Francisco 
Police Officers Association v. San Francisco, 812 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir. 1987; 
racial and gender preferences in employment testing "urmecessarily 
trammeled" interests of white males), Hayes v. North State Law Enforce­
ment Officers Association, 10 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1993; promotion of black 
officers ahead of higher ranking white officers pursuant to outdated and 
unjustified quotas in court-ordered consent decree held improper), Detroit 
Police Officers v. Young, 989 F.2d 225 (6th Cir. 1993; promotional 
afftrmative action plan terminated after 19 years when found to provide 
preferential treatment for current minorities who had experienced no actual 
discrimination, and to work excessive hardship on non-minority 
candidates), and Britton v. South Bend Community School Corporation, 35 
EPD No. 34,777 (1987; white teachers impermissibly laid off over less 
senior black teachers pursuant to planned RIF). It appears from these and 
other cases that courts have had increasing difficulty finding circumstances 
under which the ••trammeling" of the interests of non-minorities is in fact 
"necessary," and there is every reason to expect this trend to continue after 
Adarand. For assistance in making further sense of trends in reverse 
discrimination cases, and an illustration of the importance of utilization 
analyses in helping organizational practitioners ucomprehend. the razor's 
edge that they must walk between affirmative action and reverse 
discrimination," see Robinson, Seydel, and Sloan, Reverse Discrimination 
Employment Litigation: Defining the Limits ofPreferential Promotion, 46 
Lab. L.J. 131 (1995). 
The Status of the Glass Ceiling Initiative 
In a sense, current developments with respect to the Glass Ceiling 
Initiative can be seen as a counterpoint to those regarding reverse 
discrimination. Conclusions presented in a March, 1995 report of the 21­
member, bipartisan Glass Ceiling Commission created pursuant to Section 












Action and the Glass Ceiling: Contract Compliance and Litigation 
Avoidance, 21 Empl. Rei. L.J. 109, 114 (1995; the report is entitled "Good 
for Business: Making Full Use of the Nation's Human Capital" and is 
available-all 250 pages of it-from the Labor Department). A principal 
impact of the report wast~ focus debate on eliminating "barriers to full and
fair competition in the workplace [and to] finding the best person for the 
right job." This focus has important implications with respect to the 
economics of AAPs, as discussed further below, and would appear to favor 
affirmative action insofar as it would serve to enhance more inclusive 
consideration of qualified individuals for jobs at all levels of an or­
ganization. Meanwhile, according to the Commission's report~ among top 
executives at Fortune 500 and Fortune 1000 industrial companies, 97% are 
white, 95% are men, anq pay and promotion disparities remain even where 
women and minorities have been able to gain access to fast tracks or 
executive suites. The report advocates merit-based solutions rather than 
race- or gender-based quotaS, and urges that glass ceiling initiatives not 
exclude white non-Hispanic men. As Kandel notes, "it is altoge)her 
sensible that initiatives undertaken to reduce turnover and enhance upward 
mobility of women and minorities be equally applicable to white males. 
Besides spreading the benefits of worthwhile programs throughout its 
workforce, the 'inclusive' employer thereby reduces or eliminates the 
'white male anger' which can otherwise undermine such affirmative 
efforts" (21 Empl. Rei. L.J. at 115). Kandel also observes that program 
inclusiveness (availability to whites as well as minorities) was a major 
factor saving the affirmative action skills training program in Weber (443 
U.S. 193) from a finding that it had violated Title VII. 
Employment Tests and the Economic Efficiency of AAPs 
The Glass Ceiling Commission's focus on eliminating barriers to full 
and fair competition for upwardly mobile jobs relates directly to the issue 
of economic efficiency of AAPs. As Kandel makes clear, the 
Commission's report emphasizes "competition for jobs, not social 
engineering or moral worth. To the extent that workforce 'diversity' is 
advocated by the Report as a desirable goal, it is not as an end in itself, but 
as a means to help U.S .enterprises in worldwide competition which 
requires multilingual, multicultural adeptness" (21 Empl. Rei. L.J. at 114). 
A thorough analysis of more fundamental economic issues in this context~ 
can be found in Michael Se!mi's article, Testing for Equality: Merit, 
Efficiency, and the Affirmative Action Debate, 42 UCLA L.Rev. 1251 
(1995). This article is important reading for those interested in 
relationships among employment tests, affirmative action, discrimination, 
and productivity. 
Professor Selmi's article begins by challenging two assumptions which 





qualified (or unqualified) individuals will be necessarily selected over more 

qualified individuals pursuant to AAPs, and that a negative relationship 

therefore must exist between affirmative action and workforce productivity. 

Selmi debunks these myths by demonstrating that the often-minor 

differences between employment test scores of the "most qualified" 

candidate and those of the affirmative action candidate in reverse 
discrimination cases are typically only weak predictors of potential dif­
ferences in future productivity. Selmi further argues that discrimination is 
economically inefficient, and that voluntary AAPs can actually be rational 
employer responses to the persistence of employment discrimination. 
Selmi contends that AAPs can alter workplace incentives so as to increase 
effort, and thus productivity, among both protected class members and non­
members. ~ 
In support of these arguments, Selmi provides evidence from a number 
of studies to show that AAPs have not been linked to significant 
productivity losses. The author then utilizes principles regarding the 
standard error of measurem~nt and true scores to show that test score 
ranking differentials in actual reported cases are virtually meaningless from 
both practical and statistical points of view. With regard to productivity, 
Selmi presents an economic analysis to show that a more competitive 
environment can be created through AAPs by increasing the perception of 
opportunity in the workplace for groups that might otherwise be 
discouraged from participating at optimal levels. This analysis dovetails 
nicely with Kandel's point about global" competition, and the potential I 
contribution of glass ceiling and other affirmative action initiatives for U.S. 
companies to develop "multilingual, multicultural adeptness" in order to 
compete effectively in the international marketplace. 
Summary and Conclusion 
From these articles, it seems reasonable to conclude that race-based 
affirmative action will continue to draw fire for practical as well as political 
purposes. If the goal of affirmative action is to reapportion jobs and wealth 
such that the economic position of minorities comes to more closely 
resemble that historically occupied by non-minorities, then race-based I 
affirmative action programs are both under inclusive (many economically ,I 
I
disadvantaged individuals are not minorities) and over inclusive (many :I
I 
minorities are not economically disadvantaged). An affirmative action :Isystem of socioeconomic preferences to supplant the current system of ,I
race-based preferences therefore makes sense. Whether proposals to ;j
institute such a system can fare well in today's political climate remains to 
Ibe seen. All indications are that trends toward the erosion of affirmative ! 
action exemplified earlier in this article are likely to continue. Armed with il
the insights of these commentators, it should be interesting to make our 
own predictions. 
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